The Grand Renaissance Dam ( A problem or solution?)

When it is finished in 2017 the GRD will be Africa's largest hydroelectric dam (Hammond 2013). Despite Ethiopia claiming ‘natural rights’ and challenging Egypt’s dominance by constructing the dam, the resulting build-up of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt is based on a misunderstanding of the risks the dam poses to Egypt (Whittington et al 2014). The motivations behind the construction of the dam are obvious. Despite being described as the ‘Water Tower of Africa’, in 2003 a mere 3% of its hydropower potential had been developed.). Below is a table comparing the GRD to other large dams.

(Figure 1)

Egypt is particularly concerned about the GRD especially in relation to its water availability. At times of low flow in the Blue Nile, the GRD may prevent Egypt from withdrawing adequate water supplies and Egypt may be negatively affected by irrigation projects. However there is restricted understanding of the potential impacts of the Dam, especially to Egypt (Hammond 2003)

It can be argued that Egypt should be actively promoting the construction of the GRD as hydropower generation is in general a non-consumptive water-use (Whittington et al 2014) and demotes the alternative pathway for Ethiopia, which is to develop irrigation networks, which is a bigger threat to Egypt’s water security. Furthermore the dam will produce surplus energy, which can be exported across the basin potentially benefitting the wider region (Hammond 2013)

Assessing the Nile Basin Initiative

Previous to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), ministers of water for 6 countries Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda formed a technical cooperation committee, leaving the remaining 4 riparian states of the Nile basin as insignificant bystanders, which was not very equitable.

On the 22nd February 1999 in a meeting in Tanzania, a meeting of the Nile Basin Council of ministers resulted in the formal establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative. This collaboration of riparian states, unlike its predecessor involved all 10 Nile Basin countries, immediately making it more inclusive and equitable.

The Nile Basin Initiative was the first attempt by the Nile riparian’s countries to equitably share access to the Nile, whilst at the same time promoting economic cooperation (Rahman 2013). Listed below is the NBI’s Objectives:

   (Figure 3)

These objectives have proven adept at preventing an escalation of a major conflict in the region, although there are still tensions among riparian countries along the Nile. An advantage of the NBI is that it is concerned with a range of issues including river regulation, weed control, water management, river navigation as well as several other important issues (Kung 2003).

However the potential of the NBI has been downplayed by some academics.

Swain (2002) argues that a all-inclusive approach to tackle water issues at the basin level should be taken as a second step and instead focus on a sub-basin approach where the focus on addressing conflict is aimed at the core area of both the basin in a physical sense and a political sense, Egypt and Ethiopia (Swain 2002). The Nile Basin Initiative has also focussed its strategy on securing the agreement of all the Nile riparian’s on less important issues, delaying the discussion of more important issues difficult ones, in order to make itself look more effective (Swain 2002).

Despite this, the NBI still has a serious chance of success. To expect the NBI to immediately solve all the problems in the Nile Basin would be wrong, mainly due to the climatic, geographical and cultural diversity of the Baisn (Kung 2003). This belief is reflected in the NBI's realistic and pragmatic approach to solving the basins transboundary water problems by concentrating on common interests and attempting to improve solidarity through cooperation at practical levels.

Potential for cooperation?

According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), international rivers can become a powerful catalyst for co-operation. One example of the benefit of riparian states of sharing a transboundary water resource is the concept of 'benefit sharing'. This concept has been implemented in the Nile basin Initiative. Sadoff and Grey establish that distribution of benefits gained from the river (e.g. hydroelectricity) may be more politically achievable and therefore more likely than the actual sharing of the transboundary water resource. To a certain extent I agree with this line of thought because it’s easier for a country to share, knowing that it will itself receive some reward.  Furthermore, The World Bank is encouraging and investing heavily in basin wide cooperative management frameworks (Swain 2002).

Reconsidering conflict and cooperation

This post takes a look at Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi's paper 'Transboundary Water Interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation'. The paper mainly argues that academics and policy makers should look at conflict and co-operation as a transboundary 'water interaction' rather than discussing the two in isolation and that water interaction is an inherently political process.

Zeitoun and Mirumachi argue that the assessment of both conflict and cooperation as separate entities contradicts the vast majority of transboundary water scenarios, where in fact cooperation and conflict actually co-exist. Such a view maintains the belief that any conflict is bad and all forms of cooperation are good (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2002). I agree with the authors view that cooperation and conflict co-exist. As the paper cleverly put it 'it is well understood by anyone who survives a relationship' conflict and co-opertaion occur simultaneously, which form my personal experience I can agree too.  Furthermore more insight and understanding of the effective management of transboundary water resources will be achieved if they are thought of jointly in terms of interaction, rather than separate because possible disagreements and conflict of interests can be more easily distinguished.

The paper also ascertains that transboundary water interaction is an inherently political process determined by the broader political context. It is almost impossible to argue that transboundary water issues are not political in nature. Water management is at the heart of African politics for several reasons. Firstly there is fierce competition for scarce water supply between different countries and even between different cities in the same country. Fundamentally water is an essential good, so this puts water at the heart of the relationship between government and its citizens. There is also an international political perspective which includes the negotiation of terms and uses surrounding transboundary water agreements between different countries.

According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), international rivers in some cases can become a powerful catalyst for conflict, or a powerful catalyst for co-operation. One example of the benefit of riparian states of sharing a transboundary water resource is the concept of 'benefit sharing'. This concept has been implemented in the Nile basin Initiative. Sadoff and Grey ascertain that sharing of benefits derived from the river (e.g. hydroelectricity) may be more politically feasible and therefore more likely than the actual sharing of the transboundary water resource. To a certain extent I agree with this line of thought because its easier for a country to share, knowing that it will itself receive some reward.   However, as Zeitoun and Mirumachi later reiterate, this view separates conflict from co-operation, and does not acknowledge that conflicts of interests are likely to occur during the sharing of benefits.

The process of effective cooperation is more complex than we generally tend to think. International agreements are generally seen as the pinnacle of cooperation. Wolf (2003) states 'once cooperative water regimes are established through treaties, they turn out to be impressively resilient over time'. However this fails to consider that important components of the treaty may not be implemented and treaties can often favour one party, which can be termed poor or non cooperation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2002). There is more too co-operation than just signing the dotted line of the treaty and all the problems are solved. There is a need to look at compliance, goals, interests and problem solving, within the treaty. Regional agreements (particularly in the global South), whilst often originate as environmental agreements, actually serve as a vehicle to promote development goals- e.g. Hydroelectric production which can stimulate a conflict of issues, such was the case in the Zambezi river basin. It is imperative that the 'multiple faces of cooperation' are understood (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2002) in more detail, which in part can be achieved by recognising that conflict and co-opertaion co-exist.

Whether international tensions over transboundary water resources will lead to greater conflict or offer increased potential for cooperation remains a hotly debated issue throughout water related literature. But one thing is for sure, conflict and cooperation can not be discussed in isolation to one another.
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Are there alternatives to transboundary sharing?

Today's blog will divert a little from previous posts and focus slightly less on the actual sharing of transboundary water resources and focus on the concept of virtual water.

John Allan, the founder of the term 'virtual water' describes it as water embedded in commodities such as grain (Allan 2003). However, virtual water is more than just the actual water content of a product, but rather how much water was needed to make that particular product (Mauser 2009).

In this post I will briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of virtual water and then give my opinion on the idea of virtual water.

Advantages:

One major benefit of virtual water is that it has the potential to be a better alternative to resolving conflict in water scarce regions such as the Nile Basin than water scarce countries sharing a transboundary water resource (Mauser 2009). Conflict and tension may arise over the arrangements of how much water is shared out between the countries, whereas if water was imported, such disagreements may not arise. Another possible way that virtual water may be able to lower the risk of conflict over water is that importing virtual water lowers the pressure on water scarce countries to produce food. For example, Egypt imports a substantial amount amount of wheat and in doing so saves the country 7% of the water it is entitled to as agreed by the 1959 Nile treaty (Chapagain 2005).

A further advantage of virtual water is an increase in efficiency of water resource management. The increase in the trading of virtual water among water rich and water scarce countries in the year 2000, meant that over 4% of water which would have been used in agriculture was saved. The saving was accounted for by the fact that less water efficient countries were importing from the more efficient countries (Dalin 2011). The international trade of water does not only improve efficiency but also the fair distribution of water worldwide

Disadvantages:

It would be foolish, however, to assume that virtual water did not have its drawbacks. One such drawback is that countries with the highest net export of water including the United States, Canada and Australia may suffer environmental problems and a depletion of their own water resources in the future (Dalin 2011).  This highlight issues relating to the long term sustainability of virtual water.

Another disadvantage of the virtual water trade is that it could cause a dependence of water scarce countries on water rich countries, who are also often economically rich. If this occurred it could mean that countries with less water availability such as Egypt and Sudan may become less self sufficient in term of foo production, which would leave them at the hands of exporting countries. This over reliance could cause conflict, not between neighbouring countries but with the ones holding them politically hostage (Dalin 2011).

Concluding Remarks: 

As an undergraduate student and having only quickly breezed through the topic of virtual water, my opinion may not be the most reliable of opinions, however I will give it anyway. I believe the trading of virtual water has some merit, especially given its potential to distribute water more evenly across the world, as well as to improve efficiency. I do however acknowledge some issues with the concept including those related to dependency and possible political leverage. I think that the trading of virtual water should be implemented simultaneously with the cooperative sharing of transboundary water resources and not as an alternative.

Mauser,W. (2009) Water Resources: Efficient, Sustainable and Equitable Use, London: Haus Publishing Ltd

Stop fighting, its just a game

This post will be a bit more light hearted in the sense that it will discuss transboundary water resources in relation to one of my favourite things; Football.

The Nile Basin tournament, hosted in Egypt took place in January 2011 and was contested by 7 teams. These teams included Egypt, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, whilst three other teams Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda withdrew before the tournament kicked off. The tournament was proposed by the Egytptian Football Association, after an agreement could not be made to establish a football association of the Nile countries.

The eventual winners of the Tournament was Egpyt who beat Uganda 3-1 in the final. It seems Egypt dominates the other Nile basin countries on and off the field. In 2011 it was decided that the tournament  would be an annual event, Egypt even  promising to help financially support any other countries that were willing to host the tournament. However, I could not find any evidence of the tournament taking place after the inaugural 2011 tournament.

Entertaining football, however, was not the only goal of the tournament. Ministers of irrigation and foreign affairs and chairmen of the football federations from each of the participating countries were invited to the tournament to meet with their Egyptian counterparts for discussions relating to water security.

In my opinion,  football and other sports could be a way to promote solidarity between countries, similar to the way the Olympics promotes a sense of togetherness across the world stage.  However the fact that one country (Egypt) had such a big part to play in the tournament, especially given its role in the trandboundary conflict, may suggest an ulterior motive from Egypt.

In the long run maybe the tournament didn't achieve much, in terms of improving water sharing in the region, but did highlight that in fact the countries of the Nile basin can in actual fact be cooperative.

Til next time

http://www.goal.com/en/news/89/africa/2011/01/06/2292842/nile-basin-tournament-to-be-an-annual-event

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Nile_Basin_Tournament#Final

The problems facing transboundary water management in the Nile and why it's so important

This post should do what my first post did not, which is to discuss the potential problems facing countries which share transboundary water resources and explain why it is important that freshwater resources are evenly distributed among riparian states. This post will focus specifically on the Nile basin.

The Nile river basin is a great example of why transboundary water resources should be distributed fairly across resource sharing nations. Prior to the Entebbe Agreement, which shifted power over the Nile away from Egypt and Sudan, the two countries, but more specifically Egypt had almost complete control over the Nile and its resources (Di Nunzio 2013). This led to stark inequalities in the region. Such inequality can be seen in the map below (figure 1) which demonstrates the wealth of Nile Basin nations. It is clear to see that the most economically developed country is Egypt, followed by Sudan, due to the previous monopoly over the Nile. As a result economic development in countries nearest to the source was limited, as these countries could not utilise the potential of the water resources.

(Figure 1)

The Nile's other riparian states also suffered discrimination in the sense that their freshwater accessibility was being determined by another state, which may not consider their interests at all, threatening water security even further.

Following the Entebbe Agreement, Egypt has very little option but to peacefully cooperate with other Nile nations to avert a serious water scarcity crisis, especially due to its high dependence on the Nile. It is estimated that Egypt relies upon the Nile for 97% of its water needs and with its previous overuse of resources and increasing population (Rahman 2011), its dependency on the Nile may increase further in the future. It is not just Egypt, however, that relies heavily upon the river. The Nile's flowing waters is the most important source of freshwater for the entire Nile basin with over 200 million of the basin's 450 million population directly relying on the river for food and water security (Di Nunzio 2013). It is therefore imperative that the Nile Nations manage the Nile cooperatively and in a manner that benefits all parties.

However, there are problems associated with successful cooperation over the management of transboundary water resources. For example often states act in their own interests. In recent years several upstream nations such as Ethiopia and Uganda have experienced population and economic growth, which has resulted in the development of infrastructure along the Nile,  including irrigation networks and dams (Di Nunzio 2013). The current construction of Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam is one such example. When it is finished in 2017 it will be Africa's largest hydro-electric dam and will produce enough electricity for domestic use and to sell to several African countries including potentially Egypt. Egypt's claim to the Nile stems from colonial treaties and agreements dating back to almost 100 years ago. In 1929 Britain and Egypt signed a water agreement giving Egypt absolute control over the Nile, including one clause that gave Egypt the power to reject and prohibit any construction project in the Nile basin (Rahman 2011). The fact that Egypt uses dated treaties such as this to legitimise its claim to the Nile is part of the problem of implementing effective transboundary water management.

Longstanding inter-state disagreements surrounding the control of the nile has caused serious tension in the region which has the potential to lead to conflict. Even as early as 1988 Egypt's foreign minister stated that the River Nile would cause Egypt's next war. Indeed former vice-president of the world bank Ismail Serageldin stated that the wars of the 21st century would be fought over water (1995). Although talk of conflict may seem extreme, given the political instability of the African continent as a whole, as well as potential instability in the Nile basin, conflict over freshwater resources must be seen as a realistic possibility. Especially given that climate change may exacerbate the water scarcity situation in the region.