The Grand Renaissance Dam ( A problem or solution?)

When it is finished in 2017 the GRD will be Africa's largest hydroelectric dam (Hammond 2013). Despite Ethiopia claiming ‘natural rights’ and challenging Egypt’s dominance by constructing the dam, the resulting build-up of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt is based on a misunderstanding of the risks the dam poses to Egypt (Whittington et al 2014). The motivations behind the construction of the dam are obvious. Despite being described as the ‘Water Tower of Africa’, in 2003 a mere 3% of its hydropower potential had been developed.). Below is a table comparing the GRD to other large dams.

(Figure 1)

Egypt is particularly concerned about the GRD especially in relation to its water availability. At times of low flow in the Blue Nile, the GRD may prevent Egypt from withdrawing adequate water supplies and Egypt may be negatively affected by irrigation projects. However there is restricted understanding of the potential impacts of the Dam, especially to Egypt (Hammond 2003)

It can be argued that Egypt should be actively promoting the construction of the GRD as hydropower generation is in general a non-consumptive water-use (Whittington et al 2014) and demotes the alternative pathway for Ethiopia, which is to develop irrigation networks, which is a bigger threat to Egypt’s water security. Furthermore the dam will produce surplus energy, which can be exported across the basin potentially benefitting the wider region (Hammond 2013)

Assessing the Nile Basin Initiative

Previous to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), ministers of water for 6 countries Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda formed a technical cooperation committee, leaving the remaining 4 riparian states of the Nile basin as insignificant bystanders, which was not very equitable.

On the 22nd February 1999 in a meeting in Tanzania, a meeting of the Nile Basin Council of ministers resulted in the formal establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative. This collaboration of riparian states, unlike its predecessor involved all 10 Nile Basin countries, immediately making it more inclusive and equitable.

The Nile Basin Initiative was the first attempt by the Nile riparian’s countries to equitably share access to the Nile, whilst at the same time promoting economic cooperation (Rahman 2013). Listed below is the NBI’s Objectives:

   (Figure 3)

These objectives have proven adept at preventing an escalation of a major conflict in the region, although there are still tensions among riparian countries along the Nile. An advantage of the NBI is that it is concerned with a range of issues including river regulation, weed control, water management, river navigation as well as several other important issues (Kung 2003).

However the potential of the NBI has been downplayed by some academics.

Swain (2002) argues that a all-inclusive approach to tackle water issues at the basin level should be taken as a second step and instead focus on a sub-basin approach where the focus on addressing conflict is aimed at the core area of both the basin in a physical sense and a political sense, Egypt and Ethiopia (Swain 2002). The Nile Basin Initiative has also focussed its strategy on securing the agreement of all the Nile riparian’s on less important issues, delaying the discussion of more important issues difficult ones, in order to make itself look more effective (Swain 2002).

Despite this, the NBI still has a serious chance of success. To expect the NBI to immediately solve all the problems in the Nile Basin would be wrong, mainly due to the climatic, geographical and cultural diversity of the Baisn (Kung 2003). This belief is reflected in the NBI's realistic and pragmatic approach to solving the basins transboundary water problems by concentrating on common interests and attempting to improve solidarity through cooperation at practical levels.

Potential for cooperation?

According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), international rivers can become a powerful catalyst for co-operation. One example of the benefit of riparian states of sharing a transboundary water resource is the concept of 'benefit sharing'. This concept has been implemented in the Nile basin Initiative. Sadoff and Grey establish that distribution of benefits gained from the river (e.g. hydroelectricity) may be more politically achievable and therefore more likely than the actual sharing of the transboundary water resource. To a certain extent I agree with this line of thought because it’s easier for a country to share, knowing that it will itself receive some reward.  Furthermore, The World Bank is encouraging and investing heavily in basin wide cooperative management frameworks (Swain 2002).